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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development & Acquisition 
(DASN (RDA) (Acquisition Management)), asked the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) to 
analyze the contracting out of procurement functions currently being accomplished by Navy, 
Marine Corps, and other Department of Defense (DOD) Activities.  The request specifically 
focused on assessing the degree of effectiveness and shortcomings of such contracting out 
efforts.  This research sought to answer these questions:  Which contracting functions are now 
being contracted out by Navy and other DOD organizations?  How effectively have contractors 
performed on these contracts? What metrics are being used and could be used to assess the 
quality of contractor performance?  Although the primary focus of this study is the effectiveness 
of contracts used to procure contracting services, several interrelated subjects have been 
explored. Aspects of inherently governmental functions, personal service relationships, conflicts 
of interest, and legal/ethical issues were included.  Further, questions regarding the impact on 
the contracting system, the development of Contracting Officers, the participation of competing 
companies in the marketplace, training and experience qualifications, and agency procurement 
decision-making and policies were also examined. 
Introduction 
Several factors have led to an increased reliance upon the private sector to provide 
services.  One of the most critical factors has been the lack of adequate numbers of civil 
servants to perform the functions required of buying organizations.  The number of  DOD 
employees has been significantly reduced due to retirements or transfers to other agencies and, 
in certain metropolitan areas, the number of qualified applicants available to fill vacant positions 
has fallen to a seriously low level.  Another of the principal factors has been to reduce the cost 
of providing services.  With competition and a more efficient process of producing services, it is 
widely believed that significant savings have accrued.  Another factor has been the ability to 
obtain certain skills which the Government does not possess. This has become more critical as 
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agencies have reduced the size of their workforce. Yet another factor is to obtain services on an 
emergency or surge basis.  DOD has come to rely more and more extensively on service 
contractors during military conflicts.  For these reasons, some organizations have begun to 
contract out selected contracting functions associated with the acquisition process.  Further, 
some have actively promoted contracting out efforts and see this as an integral part of their 
corporate strategy.  But, for various reasons explored herein, some organizations have taken no 
action to contract out procurement functions.   
Methodology 
Sources involved in acquisition research were consulted, including the following: reports 
issued by the Government Accountability Office (GAO); theses and master’s degree projects 
from students at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and the Air Force Institute of Technology 
(AFIT); student reports from the Naval War College, Army War College, and Air War College; 
reports and studies from the RAND Corp., the Project on Government Oversight (POGO), the 
Defense Science Board (DSB), the Contract Management Institute (CMI), the Professional 
Services Council (PSC) and the Logistics Management Institute (LMI); papers presented at the 
NPS Annual Acquisition Research Symposium; and student and faculty reports from the 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU) and the University of Maryland.  Various periodicals were 
examined, including the Defense Acquisition Review Journal, Contract Management, Defense 
AT&L, and the Journal of the National Contract Management Association. 
Two survey questionnaires were used.  The first focused on participants at the policy 
and senior management levels and asked questions about the broader issues involved in 
contracted procurement services.  The second survey focused on management and operating 
level personnel and, although some of the same questions on the first survey were also posed, 
it mainly asked questions regarding the effectiveness of contracts that are being or had been 
used to procure contracting support services.  Surveys were completed by a total of one 
hundred contracting professionals and thirty-two program management and technical personnel.  
A comparison of organizational affiliation and category of survey participants is presented in 
Table 1.  All thirty-two program management and technical personnel are from the Air Force 
located at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma.  In some instances, the senior managers of a 
major acquisition organization provided collective views.  Thus, the number of individuals 
participating in the survey are greater than the number of questionnaires received. 
 
Table 1. Survey Participants 








Army 5 11 16 
Navy/Marine Corps 18 17 35 
Air Force 5 2 7 
Defense Agencies 13 25 38 
Non-Federal Agencies 4 0 4 
Air Force Prgm Mgmt & 
Tech Personnel 
0 32 32 
Totals 45 87 132 
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Personal (face-to-face) interviews were conducted with nineteen senior contracting 
personnel (over 80% of whom are from the Navy Department) many of whom also completed a 
survey.  Phone interviews were conducted with fifteen individuals and generally included those 
who had indicated willingness on their survey responses to clarify or expand upon their 
answers.  Throughout the study, the terms “procurement” and “contracting” are used 
interchangeably, as are the terms “function,” “task” and “duty.”  The terms “contracted services,” 
“contracted support services” and “procurement services” refer to those contracting functions or 
tasks that are typically performed by civil servants and are now, or could be, performed by 
contractor employees.  “Outsourcing” refers to accomplishment by contractors and does not 
include other Federal Agencies.  This research work was undertaken with the intent of exploring 
and evaluating only those actions and efforts taken by the Government in the buyer-seller 
relationship.  Although there are a significant number of companies that provide contracted 
support services as well as industry and professional associations that have intimate knowledge 
and understanding of the process, the present research was limited to the issues and problems 
experienced only by Government personnel.   
A few situations arose which impeded the numbers of surveys and interviews that might 
otherwise have been obtained.  One situation was the impression that this study was looking for 
those contracting functions which could be prime targets for contractor performance, which in 
turn could lead to a reduction in contracting workforce personnel.  A second situation occurred 
in which agencies are contracting out some functions that other agencies consider to be 
inherently governmental, and those agencies’ officials felt that they would be criticized for 
having placed these functions on contract.  A third situation involved a general feeling that top 
agency management was against placing contracting functions on contract, which made our 
study a moot point.  Lastly, some organizations simply said they were too busy to participate in 
the research. 
Discussion 
Inherently Governmental Functions 
Survey questions concerning inherently governmental functions (IGF) focused on 
whether respondents were aware of any functions considered to be inherently governmental or 
exempt from competition that are, in fact, being contracted out and the extent to which capability 
deficiencies forced organizations to identify their interpretation of inherently governmental.  Also, 
from a very limited list of functions, survey participants were asked to distinguish those they felt 
were inherently governmental as opposed to those that were not.  Forty percent of the 
respondents stated that a capability deficiency had caused their organization to assess whether 
or not a contracting function was inherently governmental.  The shortage of Full-Time 
Equivalents (FTEs) due to various forms of attrition has been exacerbated in recent years.  
Retirements and personnel transfers with the resultant loss of corporate knowledge and 
expertise have forced organizations to rethink their position regarding tasks contractors can 
perform.  The 60% that said they had not made this assessment are from organizations that 
long ago decided that certain contracting tasks were non-IGF and were placed on contract, had 
decided the entire function is off limits to contracts, or had sufficient resources to meet workload 
demands.  When asked if they knew about inherently governmental functions being contracted 
out, slightly fewer than 20% acknowledged that this is happening.  Although this may seem like 
a small number, it points out that there are functions being acquired on contract that some view 
as violating the rules.  A large part of this could be due to the disparity between those who 
believe that some contracting tasks are IGFs and those who do not. 
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Policy survey respondents were presented with a limited list of contracting functions and 
asked to classify them as either IGF or non-IGF.  From the replies, three categories were 
established: (1) “unanimously” or predominantly IGF, (2) predominantly non-IGF, and (3) 
“middle ground.”  Table 2 displays the three categories. 
Table 2. Senior Contracting Personnel Views of 




“Middle Ground” Predominantly Non-
Inherently Governmental 
Requirements determination   
 Developing Statements of Work  
 Structuring market research  
  Conducting market research 
 Performing acquisition planning  
 Developing solicitation documents  
 Issuing solicitation documents  
 Developing and applying evaluation criteria  
 Member of  Source Selection Evaluation 
Board 
 
 Evaluation of proposals/offers  
 Performing cost and price analysis  
Negotiating contract prices, terms 
& conditions 
  
Structuring & approving incentive 
plans 
  
 Preparing price negotiation memoranda  
Awarding contracts   
Negotiating contract modifications   
Determining cost allowability   
Exercising options   
 Assessing contractor performance  
Implementing action based on 
contractor performance 
  
Accepting or rejecting goods & 
services 
  
Terminating contracts   
  Preparing contracts for closeout 
 
If no more than 75% or no fewer than 25% selected a function as either IGF or non-IGF, 
the function was placed in the “middle ground” and open to interpretation.  All of the IGFs 
involve some type of Contracting Officer determination and/or decision which are considered by 
almost everyone to be within the Government’s purview.  The two functions identified as 
essentially non-IGF have been performed by contractors for several years and now seem to be 
the accepted norm.  The “middle ground” functions are basically the area of debate.  Functions 
listed close to the left of the box received the majority of IGF responses, while those functions 
close to the right received the majority of non-IGF responses.  Structuring market research is 
closely related to conducting market research and developing solicitation documents is often 
distinguished as a support effort.  These two functions could have easily slipped into the non-
IGF category.   Performing cost and price analysis is the function that seems to generate the 
most heated debate.  Many believe it to be integrally involved in either the negotiation process 
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or a Contracting Officer’s determination of price reasonableness, or both, and should not be 
contracted out.  Further, considered by several to be a core capability, it is also judged to be 
one of the weakest skills held by the Government and badly in need of significant training and 
hands-on experience.  Although tending toward the IGF side, acquisition planning, evaluation of 
offers and preparing price negotiation memoranda are just as easily viewed by many as non-
IGF. 
Personal Services Relationships 
Over 85% of the respondents felt that there are potential problems with personal 
services relationships when contracting for procurement services.  On the one hand, there is an 
overwhelming feeling that contractor employees need to be co-located with Government 
contracting personnel in order to effectively accomplish their work.  On the other, this close 
proximity presents the very ingredients that lead to personal services situations.  Many of the 
respondents felt that because Government and contractor specialists had to work together so 
intimately, such a relationship was inevitable.  Not directly causing a personal services dilemma 
but linked to the close working relationship are the circumstances involving “acceptance” of the 
service or work product performed by contractors.  Products or goods have a very definitive 
acceptance or rejection process that requires specific Government action.  Services do not have 
similar acceptance procedures.  In the case of contracting functions, who accepts the 
contractor’s work product and how formal is the process?  If the Government proceeds to use 
work packages submitted by contractors, de facto acceptance has probably occurred without an 
overt action.  At this point, the Government could certainly be liable for the decisions made 
based on the contractor input that might later prove to be faulty and damaging.  None of the 
respondents voiced an opinion that the prohibition on personal services contracts should be 
eliminated; however, if asked, it is suspected that a majority would willingly agree with the 
removal of certain aspects of the personal services restriction.  
Conflicts of Interest 
Survey participants responded with numerous conflict of interest situations they believed 
could easily occur unless precautionary measures were instituted.  Access to company 
proprietary and business sensitive information, competing in cases where firms participated in 
developing requirements, an actual or perceived ability to influence procurement actions, biases 
against certain companies for obvious or even unknown reasons, insight into the Government’s 
requirements process, mergers and acquisitions that cause questionable affiliations, and other 
similar opportunities to inappropriately affect Government procurement were cited as potential 
problems with contractors.  Some respondents remarked that conflicts of interest could also 
easily occur with civil servants working so closely with contractor employees.  Differences in 
compensation, future employment opportunities, and personal friendships with contractor 
employees that may even have originated when both worked for the Government were 
observed as some of the conflict of interest situations in which civil servants could easily 
become embroiled. A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2008) report concluded 
that when contractors are performing duties closely supporting inherently governmental 
functions, risks exist that could result in loss of Government control and decision-making.  The 
Government and contractors are both responsible for ensuring that measures are in place to 
prevent conflicts of interest. 
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Legal and Ethical Issues 
This research asked if there are any legal issues or impediments to which over 85% 
responded in the affirmative.  Respondents are concerned about three primary areas: (1) 
violating the prohibition against placing inherently governmental functions on contract, (2) 
averting personal services relationships, and (3) avoiding conflicts of interest.  They state that 
proper non-disclosure agreements, financial disclosure statements, and vigorous application of 
safeguards and security mechanisms are critical to prevention.  It is well known that civil and 
criminal penalties await Federal employees if they violate statutes prohibiting unethical and 
improper behavior in the execution of their responsibilities.  This is generally not true if 
contractor employees performing procurement functions for the Government act in this manner.  
Several situations concerning contractor personnel involved with financial conflicts of interest, 
impaired impartiality, misuse of information, misuse of authority and misuse of Government 
property have transpired.  There has been some discussion about the suitability of changing the 
laws to make them applicable to contracted employees when they are working on behalf of the 
Government.  Some suggest that instead, contract clauses should incorporate such 
requirements.  At the very least, contractor personnel should be held liable and accountable for 
actions taken in their capacity as “Government agents.”  Whether this is accomplished 
statutorily or through contractual clauses, some action in this direction is absolutely crucial. 
Ethics was brought up on the Policy and Senior Management questionnaire and a 
significant majority of the respondents believe that ethical issues are associated with contracting 
for procurement services.  To some, this took the form of organizational conflicts of interest 
while to others it involved contractor access to procurement sensitive information and the 
opportunity to take unfair advantage of the system.  Most of the respondents expressed concern 
about contractor loyalties and motivations which might impair their objectivity and impartiality 
when acting as an “agent” for the Government.  The judgment and interpretation of the laws and 
regulations by Government employees should not be replaced by contractor personnel.   The 
best interests of the Government should be foremost in any action taken by someone in the 
contracting process.  Misgivings can easily arise when contractor employees take these actions. 
Trust in the system can be easily and seriously jeopardized.   
Procurement Functions Contracted Out 
Over recent years, the numbers and types of functions contracted out has greatly 
increased.  Some organizations have become concerned that too great a percentage of 
workforce positions are filled with contractor employees and have begun to develop plans to 
reduce that percentage.  Close to 60% of survey participants indicated that at least some 
procurement functions are being contracted out.  Policy and Senior personnel have fewer 
situations of contracting out while Management and Operating Level Personnel are 
predominantly from organizations that are contracting out procurement functions.  When 
isolating the Defense Agencies from the Services and others, however, that number exceeded 
85%.  When looking only at Navy and Marine Corps organizations, that number dropped slightly 
below 35%.  These findings are consistent with other studies, which found the Defense 
Agencies with the highest ratio of contracted support services and the Navy and Marine Corps 
with the lowest.  When asked which functions are involved, contract closeout was identified with 
the greatest frequency.  This was true for all Services and the Defense Agencies.  Policy and 
Senior Management personnel tended to cite market research, acquisition planning, drafting 
policy, developing evaluation criteria, evaluation of offers, and requirements development as the 
predominant functions contracted out.  Some policy/senior personnel did state, however, that all 
functions performed by 1102s, except for inherently governmental functions, are placed on 
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contract.  The percentage of Management and Operating Personnel who reported functions 
contracted out in their organizations was much higher and included all contract specialist 
functions in support of the Contracting Officer in both pre-award and post-award phases.  Most 
were careful to explain that the approvals, determinations and decisions made by Contracting 
Officers were not included. 
The most prevalent reasons cited for contracting out are the lack of organic resources to 
meet workload demands and the lack of needed skills or expertise in certain areas.  The 
continual downsizing and freezes on hiring new personnel over the last several years, together 
with an increase in the workload, has severely strained the contracting community.  In certain 
geographical areas, there is constant turnover and an inability to fill 1102 vacancies with 
qualified applicants.  In some cases, contractors are used to obtain exposure to business 
concepts and insight into commercial practices and technology.  Some stated that hiring 
contractors is generally easier and faster than trying to obtain Federal employees through the 
cumbersome civil service personnel process.  Contractors provide greater flexibility in adjusting 
to workload fluctuations, particularly due to surge situations.  They can also provide continuity to 
those cases in which organizations are experiencing a very high turnover of contract specialists.   
The most common reason for not contracting out procurement functions is that the 
organization believes all aspects of contracting are inherently governmental.  Even if the 
organization did not consider contracting inherently governmental, there was a preference 
against contracting out, especially if interchangeability of personnel or adaptability was 
threatened.  In smaller offices, Contracting Officers are performing most contract specialist 
functions that would be difficult to untangle from their decision-making functions.  In some 
cases, the organization claimed that sufficient resources existed to meet workload requirements 
or that outsourcing the functions did not provide any additional advantages.  A few organizations 
indicated that the potential for conflicts of interest or other ethical problems had steered them 
away from using contractors.  In a couple of cases, respondents felt that contractors were more 
expensive than Government employees.  One scenario that has been cause for concern is 
contractor default.  Buying offices that have turned over contract specialist workload to 
contractor employees may be in a difficult situation if the contractor is terminated for default.  It 
would be arduous to explain to the buying office’s customers that procurement actions are 
delayed because the contractor(s) defaulted.  If a significant portion of that office’s workforce 
consisted of contractor employees, the added burden may be too overwhelming for the civil 
servants in the office. 
Effectiveness of Contracted Services 
Management and Operating Level Personnel expressed overwhelmingly that contracts 
for procuring contracting functions were highly effective or somewhat effective.  A deeper 
analysis of the results, however, shows that most of the respondents indicating a positive 
effectiveness of contracts based their evaluation on a simple objective set of metrics. First, did 
contractor performance allow the command to meet its mission, and second, was overall 
performance good enough to consider the contractor for future work.  The heart of the 
rudimentary metric gets at the most basic rationale for contracting out any function, getting the 
job done and doing it satisfactorily. Responses are based primarily on criteria that find their 
basis in whether the contractor allowed the activity or business unit to achieve its mission or 
productivity goals, and additionally, whether the contractor had any significant performance 
problems that would preclude them from being considered as a candidate for future award of 
similar work.  No other criteria for measuring effectiveness were being systemically applied.  
What is challenging for contract managers is that metrics are difficult to capture in any detailed 
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objective format.  The subjective nature of this type of assessment by the population surveyed is 
very common.  It is, however, a measure that can be captured by Past Performance Information 
(PPI) systems, and the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) 
currently in use within DOD. 
Limitations on Effort Contracted Out 
Three aspects of limitations on contractors performing procurement functions were 
explored: (1) the duration of contracted support effort, (2) whether contractors should be 
physically located with Government personnel performing the same tasks, and (3) percentage 
limitations on the amount of procurement effort that could be contracted out.  The first area was 
presented on the policy survey while the latter two areas were presented on the 
management/operating level personnel surveys. 
 Duration 
Over 60% of the respondents believed these contracts should be of a temporary nature.  
Organizations which tended to currently have more procurement functions contracted out were 
split over the idea of temporary versus permanent.  The proponents for temporary contracts felt 
it should only be used for surge or emergent requirements while the Government recruits and 
trains organic resources.  Those advocating a more permanent duration felt it will be several 
years, if ever, before Government resource requirements are met, thus a lasting contractual 
relationship should be established.  Some feel that certain tasks, such as contract closeout, 
have such a low priority they might never be appropriately completed without contractor support 
and should be made permanent regardless of in-house resource levels.  It appears to the 
researchers that almost all the reasons cited in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) as 
valid alternatives for the use of advisory and assistance services (A&AS) contracts seem to 
imply temporary situations.  Obtaining advice, points of view, opinions, special knowledge, 
alternative solutions, support to improve operations, and assistance with more efficient and 
effective operation of managerial or hardware systems all give the impression that agency 
management would acquire these “consultant” services on an as-needed basis. Further, the 
language does not give the impression that the performance of routine tasks on a day-to-day 
basis is the intent of employing this capability.  If management policy is to utilize contracted 
support only if we must, then certainly all contracts for this support should be viewed as 
temporary until no longer required.  If management policy is to leave this up to each individual 
organization to decide, then the types of functions they perform and their overall view of the 
procurement responsibility will drive their choice. 
 Co-location 
Closely related to the matter of personal services relationships during contract 
performance is the location of contractor employees when they are carrying out their duties.  An 
overwhelming 75% majority of respondents emphatically expressed the need for close 
communications on a face-to-face basis between all members of the acquisition team.  The 
professional interaction that will occur through physical proximity outweighs any risks that might 
surface.  The day-to-day working conditions requiring communication, efficient interaction, 
responsive feedback/input, and professional interface to advance learning and understanding all 
support a blended workforce.  Past attempts at separation have shown this to severely hinder 
smooth accomplishment of the contracting functions.  The 25% who said contractor employees 
should not be in the same spaces as civil servants were not denying the benefits of personal 
interaction but rather were implying that the risks are more than should be accepted.  Access to 
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sensitive and proprietary data, security considerations, and the potential for conflicts of interest 
was of real concern.  Personal service concerns appear to be diminishing. 
 Percentage of Contracted Services 
The last area related to restrictions on the extent of contractor participation is the idea of 
confining the percentage of effort that activities can place on contract.  A Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU) report recommended that each contracting activity be limited to no more than 
25% of their workforce that may be contracted out.  The researchers decided to ask not only 
where the percentage limitation on the workforce should be established, but also what 
percentage of the workload should be limited to outsourcing.  Regarding workforce, just over 
50% of the respondents said that it should be under 25% and the total reaches three-fourths of 
the respondents when one goes to a 50% limitation.  Just over 45% of the respondents believe 
that contracting out should be constrained to under 50% of the total workload while that 
percentage increases to 65% if half of the workload is the limitation.  
Experience and Training Requirements 
The DOD acquisition workforce has been criticized over the years for its lack of skills, 
knowledge and abilities to execute its responsibilities.  The Report of the Commission on 
Government Procurement, the Packard Commission report and several other studies from 
similar groups have pointed to the need for a professional workforce meeting minimum 
standards established for education, training and experience.  Recommendations from these 
studies served as the impetus that created the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
(DAWIA) and led to the standards in place today.  It would be justifiable to expect that anyone 
performing contracting functions for DOD should meet these standards and qualifications.  
Should this expectation be extended to contractor personnel performing procurement functions 
for the Government?  And if so, how difficult would it be to impose and enforce DAWIA 
standards on contractors?  This was the issue explored in both surveys.  The Policy and Senior 
Management survey asked about DAWIA implications and whether DAWIA should be imposed 
on contractors, while the Management and Operating Personnel survey queried participants as 
to the level of difficulty encountered if an attempt were made to compel contractors to comply 
with DAWIA.  Seventy percent of the policy survey respondents felt there are DAWIA 
implications whereas about 65% felt that DAWIA or DAWIA-like requirements should be 
imposed.  Forty-five percent of the management/operating personnel said it would be difficult or 
very difficult to impose and enforce DAWIA requirements, while, in contrast, over 45% noted 
that it would be easy.  Although not an overwhelming majority, most participants felt that DAWIA 
is important to the issue of using contracted employees.   
The argument for application of DAWIA includes the beliefs that these requirements are 
critical elements in the performance of complex functions to ensure individuals have the ability 
to think logically, act competently, stay current in the field, meet contractual expectations, and 
perform in a proficient manner.  Proponents believed that contractors should be held to the 
same standard of competence as DOD personnel. Those opposing application of DAWIA claim: 
it will cost the Government an additional expense for contractors to meet the standards; most 
contractor employees are former Government personnel and probably already have these 
certifications; DAWIA is a statutory requirement placed on the Government and not industry; 
some are already using DAWIA standards as an evaluation criterion in source selections or use 
DAWIA language in statements of work to describe desired labor categories, and it will inhibit 
competition.  There appear to be valid arguments on both sides.  It seems as if the argument for 
DAWIA focuses primarily on the level of skills and competencies personnel should hold, while 
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the argument against mainly suggests that DAWIA qualifications are already being used to a 
certain extent and to push any further would be costly to the Government.   One might conclude 
that if DAWIA is already being used in this environment to one extent or another, full application 
of this qualification should not be a difficult stretch.  Further, although there may be added 
expense to the Government to bring contractor employees up to a certain level of competence, 
failure to do so may be even more costly in the less-than-satisfactory performance of 
contracting functions, even though there might be Government oversight. 
Impact on the Contracting System 
The research examined the affect contracted procurement services might have on the 
contracting system by looking at three aspects: (1) the development of future Contracting 
Officers, (2) the development of procurement options by agency management, and (3) the 
extent to which companies might not want to participate in Government procurement.  The first 
two areas were addressed on both surveys while the last was asked only on the policy survey. 
 Contracting Officers 
Over 65% of the respondents felt that contracting out procurement functions could have 
a damaging impact on the development of future Contracting Officers, slightly over 20% felt it 
would not have any affect, and less than 10% thought it might have a beneficial impact.  
Respondents believing a damaging impact could occur pointed to the critical need to nurture 
and cultivate a competent and professional workforce.  Significant contract specialist experience 
is needed to progress through the basic and intermediate levels to ultimately reach the 
advanced and expert proficiency levels required of Contracting Officers.  One needs to be 
exposed to the broadest cross-section of contracting tasks that permits development of the 
critical thinking skills and competencies so fundamental to making complex Contracting Officer 
decisions.  It was argued that contract specialists need to experience the various avenues one 
might pursue in accomplishing a particular objective.  They need to grasp the underlying 
mechanics and inner workings and, in fact, they need to fail from time-to-time to discover the 
weaknesses and risks surrounding particular courses of action.  They need to rotate through 
various assignments in contracting to undergo and be exposed to the specific facets these 
duties offer.  Contract specialists need to be mentored.  Not only must they eventually acquire 
strong managerial skills but they must also develop leadership capabilities.  The Government 
acts through its Contracting Officers and, by extension, its contract specialists.  They are the 
“face to industry” with which the Government speaks and acts.  They exhibit authority, execute 
responsibilities, create relationships and perform duties all as part of the Government’s side of 
the buyer-seller relationship.  All of these abilities are accumulated on the job, integrated with 
appropriate levels of training and education.  Many would argue that the “culturing” acquired 
through mentoring must be achieved by interaction with a Government workforce, while others 
would assert that capable and adept contractor personnel can greatly assist to the same 
degree.  It can be rationalized that the existence of contractor personnel working as contract 
specialists in a Government organization can bring new dimensions to the performance of 
procurement duties.  An important ingredient frequently missing in buying offices is the 
sensitivity and understanding of commercial and industrial procurement practices that work well, 
or do not function well, in the business world.  Sound business methods and the decisions that 
result from genuine business thinking are vital to any “business” even if it is the business of 
Government procurement.  The research has suggested, however, that most of the contractor 
staff employed to perform contracting functions are former Government acquisition personnel 
who have had little, if any, industry experience to bring to the procurement table.  Some have 
even complained that the Government contracting knowledge they do bring is outdated and 
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lacks currency.  The business manager’s role required of contracting professionals today differs 
from the contracting technician’s role of even a few years ago.  The research thus far has 
suggested that contractor employees performing procurement functions are dedicated, 
trustworthy and reliable.  Their loyalty to the US is unquestioned.  However, because their 
livelihood is derived from a private entity, there could be an inkling of suspicion on the part of 
Government managers that these employees might not always be placing the best interests of 
the Government ahead of all others.  This thought could carry into the interactions between 
Government contract specialists and contractor personnel where proposed courses of action 
might not be the most beneficial to the Government.  Ruling out ignorance or incompetence for 
the moment, some would question that contractor employees would investigate all viable 
alternatives before coming forth with a proposed solution, particularly if one or more alternatives 
were perceived as detrimental to their company.  
 Procurement Options 
One of the major concerns regarding procurement of contracting functions is the long-
term affect this would have on the ability of agency management to develop and consider 
procurement options.  Over 40% of the respondents believed that this will expand the 
procurement options while less than 25% believed it will limit such options.  Almost 30% felt it 
would neither limit nor expand the procurement options.  Most notably, Policy and Senior 
Management personnel mostly believed that it will enhance options.  Arguments can be made 
for both the notion that options are expanded and the concern that options are limited.  Several 
valid points support the former.  Contractors can free up Government personnel to perform 
more complex or value added tasks; they can come with specific skills and expertise to 
supplement Government weaknesses; they usually operate in a competitive environment and, 
therefore, have developed innovative approaches that can be shared with the Government; they 
are not as stove-piped in their thinking and training, and they come at a time when in-house 
resources and capabilities appear to be extremely low.  One of the chief reasons set forth by 
proponents of the “expand” position is that contractor employees bring knowledge of industry 
best practices and business concepts that can be shared with contract specialists.  This could 
be a way of introducing commercial procedures and actions, which might greatly assist in 
executing a more effective and efficient procurement system.  Consider, however, the sources 
from which these contractor personnel might come.  Many buying organizations claim that their 
contractors use former Government civil servants and military personnel, which increases their 
ability to perform contracting functions.  But this almost assures that they will have had little 
industry experience.  Even those individuals who have previously worked for companies holding 
prime contracts with the Federal Government have been in the Contracts Division and 
interfacing directly with their Federal counterparts.  Not until you get to someone with 
experience in the Procurement or Subcontracts Department of a company will you find an 
individual likely to be immersed in business practices.  If employees come from outside this 
realm, they probably have had little “Government” experience with which to execute their 
contracting responsibilities and will most likely have a significant learning curve in becoming 
familiar with the Federal procurement world.  The prime reasons set forth by those who claim it 
will limit options involve: (1) a belief that a contractor’s objectivity will be questioned because 
they might not always have the Government’s best interests at heart; (2) the restrictive nature of 
firewalls and other safeguards necessary to ensure prevention of conflicts of interest; (3) a 
denial of valuable training and experience for junior Government personnel; (4) contractual 
limitations placed on organizations as to how they can use contractor employees; (5) 
experience with contractors where little assistance with options was provided; and (6) fewer 
experienced civil servants available to adequately assess and evaluate contractor performance.  
Those who felt there would be no affect on the ability to develop procurement options 
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essentially believed that talented individuals will make a considerable contribution regardless of 
their origin: Government or contractor.   Further, they point out, it really is up to management to 
decide how to act on specialists’ input, no matter what the source 
 Market Participation 
The extent to which companies are willing to participate in procurements when one or 
more other companies are involved in performing contracting functions for the Government 
should be of some concern.  The health of the industrial base is often measured by the amount 
and nature of competition.  If companies become suspicious of their treatment in Government 
competitions, their eagerness to continue may be dampened.  The result could be that less 
information is forthcoming, particularly confidential and private data, or worse, that companies 
withdraw from Government competitions altogether.  The “large” contractor dependent on 
Government contracts, particularly if it is a sole source, is less likely to disengage but could 
potentially restrict the flow of information.  Companies with a significant amount of commercial 
business in addition to public contracts could very well decide to no longer stay connected with 
Government procurement.  Over one-half of the respondents are concerned about a negative 
impact.  Most of the respondents from the Services, over 75%, believed that a negative affect 
could occur, but no one from the Defense Agencies held this belief.  Many of those from the 
Defense Agencies have had experience with contracted procurement services and can report 
their views from actual situations.  The primary concern from those expressing a negative 
impact centers on the fairness and objective treatment of competing firms.  The inappropriate 
use of proprietary data, biased evaluations, and undue influence by private companies all can 
lead to distrust in the integrity of the contracting process.  Some would point out that all of these 
abuses could occur with Government personnel as well but Federal laws impose civil and 
criminal sanctions on these individuals which is not the case with contractor employees.  This 
affect is subtle and difficult to measure because it entails industry perceptions.  It is unlikely that 
most companies, if questioned, would cite their distrust of the system as the reason for non-
participation.  
 Integrity of the Contracting Process 
This area was brought out on both surveys.  Although some of the respondents asserted 
that the best way to ensure integrity is to completely avoid using contractors, most provided 
thoughts and ideas they felt would help to maintain a robust contracting system.  Many pointed 
to proactive efforts that will maintain necessary components of integrity.  Sensible policies that 
discuss the legal, ethical, and practical aspects are critical.  Integrity has to do with the image 
and reputation of the system.  The actions, or inactions, resulting from “challenges” to the 
system, such as fraudulent or abusive events, shape the character and personality of the 
system.  How the Government handles a breach of our laws and ethics policies, both by civil 
servants and contractors, is highly visible and reaches to the heart of our moral fiber.  It is the 
responsibility of every member of the acquisition team to do his or her utmost to preserve the 
highest quality of our collective personality and culture.  Certainly, safeguards and precautions 
are vital.  Methods to discourage or prevent conflicts of interest, illegal actions, and other similar 
activities must be in place.  Internal Government efforts, such as oversight, audits, reviews, 
surveillance, awareness training, and firewalls can and should be used.  External efforts 
focused on contractors are also important and could include non-disclosure statements to 
protect sensitive data, financial disclosure, and ethical and integrity certifications.  Going a step 
further, it could be argued that contractor employees who have been entrusted with the same 
responsibilities as civil servants should face the same consequences for contraventions of that 
trust.  Civil and criminal sanctions should apply equally to all who are accountable for public 
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endeavors.  A very recent (March 2008) GAO report cited the need for additional conflict of 
interest safeguards for contractor employees who work alongside DOD civil servants. 
 Procurement Policy 
This topic was broached to the Policy and Senior Management personnel in both the 
surveys and interviews.  Over 60% believe that a policy statement would be extremely helpful in 
clarifying top management’s position on all aspects of this issue.  Their main concern is the 
range in difference of opinion concerning the definition of inherently governmental functions and 
a more direct application to contracting functions is needed.  The 35% who do not believe a 
policy statement is necessary believed that sufficient policy and guidance already exists and 
any further language on the subject would probably serve to make things more restrictive.  Key 
elements that should be included if such a policy were published varied.  Respondents felt a 
policy should be very flexible and include some or all of the following: (1) identify those to whom 
the policy applies, (2) identify functions that are considered acceptable for contracting out, (3) 
cite safeguards to be used, (4) identify sanctions for failure to comply with the policy, (5) provide 
conflict of interest mitigation strategies, (6) establish approvals and approval levels, (7) 
emphasize that contractors have no decision authority, (8) specify that contractors cannot 
commit the Government, (9) suggest best practices in using contractors, (10) identify risks and 
how to manage them, (11) identify what contract types should be used,  (12) require non-
disclosure agreements and financial disclosure statements, (13) suggest metrics to be used in 
evaluating contractor performance, (14) enumerate required contractor credentials or 
qualifications, and (15) outline the extent to which contractors can participate in Government 
events outside the workplace. 
Conclusions 
Contracting out of procurement functions has been effective, however, robust 
metrics to measure and assess contractor performance are lacking.  Almost all 
respondents stated that contracting out of procurement functions was effective, however, most 
utilized mission attainment and perceptions of overall contractor performance as metrics.  These 
measures should not be discounted, as they are clearly important to the end user.  However, 
they represent a fuzzy account of effectiveness without clear criteria.  There were no 
comprehensive or universal metrics nor framework utilized for determining effectiveness across 
process, workforce, and outputs with regard to quantitative measures (objective) and qualitative 
measures (subjective).  Any specific metrics cited were generally being utilized in an ad hoc and 
inconsistent manner.  In light of capacity and capability shortfalls, the ability to utilize contractors 
to complete essential missions is considered a success.  However, long-range assessment of 
effectiveness against established criteria is not occurring. 
The phrase “inherently governmental function” continues to be inconsistently 
interpreted and applied throughout DOD.  The blurred distinctions between inherently 
governmental and non-inherently governmental functions caused by the discretionary ability of 
agencies to decide its borders will continue to trouble the acquisition process until clarification 
has occurred.  The Acquisition Advisory Panel has recommended that OFPP update the 
principles agencies use in determining which functions must be performed by Government 





==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=ÅêÉ~íáåÖ=ëóåÉêÖó=Ñçê=áåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ=======- 418 - 
=
=
Personal services relationships are almost inevitable in the close working 
circumstances required between Government contracting employees and contractor 
personnel performing procurement functions.  The lines between the buyer-seller 
relationship and the employer-employee relationship have become more distorted than ever.  
Contract award requires much higher-level review and interaction with the author of documents.  
These exchanges, if done between Government Contracting Officers and contractors could be 
interpreted as personal services.  The co-location of contractor employees in Government 
facilities certainly creates the appearance that they are Government employees if not actual 
treatment as such.  The contracting functions that might be contracted out are frequently so 
closely intertwined with functions that must be performed by Government personnel that a 
personal services relationship will almost certainly develop. 
The contracting community is seriously concerned about the potential for 
conflicts of interest, both organizational and personal, when contractors are used to 
perform contracting functions.  The issue of conflicts of interest has come up on numerous 
occasions during this research.  Legal concerns almost always turn into a discussion of conflicts 
of interest and ethical considerations frequently result in the same scenario.  Government 
employees have been so carefully trained over the last several years regarding not only 
inappropriate but also illegal behavior that they are very sensitive to not only actual situations 
but also the perception of conflicts.  One step to lessen the potential for conflicts of interest 
would be to establish firewalls within the organization that prevent contractor employees from 
operating outside the specific boundaries of their particular project.  In reality, this becomes very 
expensive to structure and enforce.  One drawback is that this does not allow contractor 
personnel to transfer knowledge and freely interact with Government contract specialists outside 
their firewall, which has been cited as a benefit to having contractors present in the first place. 
The Acquisition Advisory Panel believes that because the FAR provides considerable leeway to 
agencies in addressing actual or potential conflicts of interest and because there is a lack of 
guidance in mitigating such conflicts leading to inconsistent application of the regulations, 
uniform regulatory language is needed. 
Specific measures must be taken to ensure ethical standards are maintained and 
the integrity of the contracting process is protected.  One might assume that so much 
education has gone into shaping the ethical character and identity of the acquisition workforce in 
recent years, that this conclusion would be unnecessary.  The Darleen Druyun affair caused 
considerable consternation within the acquisition workforce, particularly contracting community.  
This situation came up during interviews in the context of ethical principles and an imperative 
need to protect the integrity of the acquisition and contracting processes.  It caused acquisition 
organizations to “pull back” and reexamine the fundamental structure of their ethical climate.  
Are the right checks and balances in place to prevent or discourage such events?  Does the 
senior leadership put correct and suitable emphasis on ethical principles and moral values?  Are 
instances of ethical and standards of conduct transgressions handled in a vigorous fashion?  
Are subtle indiscretions and instances of wrongdoing dealt with promptly and aptly?  Have we 
assured industry, with overt measures, that such irresponsible actions will not be repeated?  A 
majority of survey respondents deem that ethical issues are clearly associated with contracting 
for procurement services and that specific actions are necessary to protect the integrity of the 
contracting process. 
Contracting out of procurement services will have a negative affect on the ability 
of the Federal Government to develop Contracting Officers but may expand the ability of 
Government agencies to develop procurement options.  Over 65% of the respondents 
maintained the former. Contracting Officers grow from the experience of having worked as 
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contract specialists.  They need to grasp the underlying fundamentals, concepts and basics; 
understand the implications of particular courses of action; and experience various assignments 
that require critical thinking, interpretation of regulations and policies, judgment skills, cultural 
awareness and the ability to make trades.  All of these skills and abilities are acquired on the 
job, interspersed with appropriate levels of training and education.   As the decision is made to 
increase the number of contractors in the workforce, there will be fewer full time civil servants 
hired, which ultimately reduces the pool of potential Contracting Officers.  If lower level functions 
are contracted out, they may be ill-prepared to do the more complex tasks later in their careers. 
Over 40% of the respondents felt procurement options would be expanded.  They cited that 
contractors can bring new ideas to the discussion, they can interject industry business methods, 
they allow Government personnel to perform more difficult tasks, they can come with specific 
skills and expertise, and they may have innovative approaches which can be shared with the 
Government.   Government procurement has long been reproached for its lack of understanding 
of commercial methods and sound business concepts and practices.  Contractors may, for 
example, be able to accomplish and supply market research and planning alternatives that 
would be more difficult for Government personnel to provide. 
There is mixed opinion regarding the affect contracting out of procurement 
services would have on companies participating in the marketplace for Government 
contracts.  This research started with the premise that there could be a negative affect on the 
willingness of some companies to either compete for Government contracts or to be open with 
information, technology and data if contractors were performing Government contracting 
functions.  If companies become suspicious of their treatment in Government competitions, their 
eagerness to continue may be dampened.  Firms are more likely to question the integrity of the 
process if non-Government personnel handle proprietary information and participate in or 
influence acquisition strategies and source selections.  Vendors could lose confidence in the 
fairness and objective treatment of offerors.  Although a majority held this view, several 
respondents, with many years of experience in using contracted procurement services believed 
that there would not be a negative affect on market participation.  In all of their dealings with 
industry, they have not seen any perceived or real impact on market participants.  They felt that 
offerors are very willing to do business with the Government even though other companies are 
performing contracting functions. 
Government contracting functions are being performed by contractors because 
buying organizations lack sufficient human resources to accomplish mission 
requirements.  Time and again throughout the surveys and interviews, the chief response to a 
question about the need to use contractors was that the levels of Government personnel are too 
low to permit adequate performance of the workload.  Contracting Officers and contract 
specialists are overwhelmed and feel they are working in sweat shops.  In certain geographical 
areas, the same positions in other Federal agencies are far less demanding and provide the 
same level of compensation.  Openings in these agencies are very attractive.  It is literally 
impossible to fill vacant positions with qualified applicants. Downsizing actions taken in the 
acquisition workforce over the last several years, large numbers of retirements, hiring freezes, 
slowly developing intern programs and a cumbersome personnel recruitment system all have 
added to the problem.  Although hiring authority has improved in very recent years, there is a 
significant gap between the entry level and the journeyman level employee.  All of these 
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A majority of senior contracting personnel believe that contracts for procurement 
services should be of a temporary nature.  Over 60% of senior contracting personnel believe 
it should be on a temporary basis and limited to surge or emergent demands while the 
Government recruits and trains organic resources.  There is recognition that a periodic 
reevaluation of need and internal capability should be the deciding point to continue under 
contract.  Although these contracts are viewed as “temporary,” if the long-term plan is to convert 
back to the Government any functions contracted out after sufficient staff has been recruited 
and hired, then the timeframes could be in years.  If the contracts are for certain functions, such 
as market research or requirements development, in which the contractor is typically engaged in 
a specific acquisition under a task order, then these are of a more temporary nature.  There is 
not a unanimous opinion that they be temporary.  Some felt they were recognizing reality by 
pointing out the long-term problem of getting additional Government billets, and that contracts 
should be placed on a permanent basis until and unless a cadre of trained Government 1102s is 
in place, which will take years.  Contract closeout is an example of a recurring need in which 
organizations may never be caught up and contracted services are, out of necessity, integrated 
into the normal workload. 
Contractor personnel performing procurement functions should be co-located 
with Government contracting personnel.  There is a need for close communications on a 
face-to-face basis between all members of the acquisition team. Contractor personnel must be 
an active part of the Government team, building solid working relationships and learning from 
each other.  Physically separating Government and contractor employees hampers 
communication and would not create a very conducive work environment or atmosphere and 
might tend to develop an “us” versus “them” mentality.  With multi-functional Government teams, 
it could be detrimental to segregate out the contractor employees.  Services involve personal 
interaction and relationships.  Physical separation simply artificially complicates performance of 
a cohesive objective.  The interface that occurs through physical proximity outweighs most risks 
that might surface.  Professional interaction and synergy are needed to efficiently perform the 
functions. There is a need to be close to the customer for effective support and to reap the 
efficiencies of real-time decision-making. Also, co-location will aid in the performance of the 
Government’s responsibility for contractor oversight.  Examples exist in which contractor 
employees were physically separated but were relocated to the Government facility because the 
ability of Government personnel to interact with contractors was very difficult.  It is true that 
there is the potential for direction by the Government leading to personal services, and physical 
separation would assist in the perception that the services are not personal.  Additionally, 
access to sensitive and proprietary data, security considerations, and the potential for conflicts 
of interest is of real concern. Safeguards and security measures must be taken to protect 
against such occurrences. 
The percentage of the contracting workforce and/or the percentage of the 
contracting workload placed on contract for performance by contractor employees 
should not exceed an established maximum.  This study evaluated a limitation in terms of 
workforce and workload.  The surveys indicate that most individuals advocate a maximum 
somewhere between 25% and 50% of either measure of effort.  Although full time equivalents 
are easy to measure and a percentage of an activity’s end strength is easy to calculate, it is the 
view of this research that the percentage limitation be applied to workload as opposed to 
workforce.  Individual contracting members of a buying organization perform a range of tasks 
and duties.  Cutting them out of the organization slices through these tasks without regard to the 
complexity or nature of the tasks involved.  Further, when focusing on workload, an activity can 
group various tasks that are candidates for performance by contractors, such as contract 
closeout duties, and apply the percentage to the grouped tasks.  Government contract 
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specialists do not perform just one set of duties, such as contract closeout, but are typically 
engaged in a fuller range of responsibilities.  Workload considerations also permits the 
organization to think in terms of grouped tasks that can easily be described in statements of 
work, are fairly homogeneous, may be of low risk, and might be easily severable and require far 
less interaction with Government personnel, thereby potentially even allowing performance at 
the contractor’s facility.  
Requirements similar to those found in the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA) could be imposed on contractor employees performing 
Government procurement functions without difficulty.  Sixty-five percent of the senior 
contracts leadership believed that DAWIA or DAWIA-like certification requirements should be 
imposed on contractor personnel performing contracting functions for the Government.  There is 
a feeling that these requirements are critical elements in the performance of complex functions 
and that contractors should be required to have the same level of competence as Government 
personnel.  Contracting tasks have become more complicated, of a high-risk nature, and 
demand intellectually capable personnel who can reason through the issues with common 
sense and wisdom.  Many of the contractor personnel working in Government offices are former 
civil servants or military who achieved DAWIA certification while in the Government.  They most 
likely already hold the requisite credentials.  If serious thought is given to requiring DAWIA, the 
extent to which standards already exist that are comparable to DAWIA-type requirements 
should be explored.  Professional association certification programs, industry association and 
corporate training programs, and academic certificate programs are all examples of existing or 
potential methods for alternatively meeting DAWIA-type standards.  
There is general opposition among Navy and Marine Corps contracts leaders to 
the notion of contracting out procurement functions.  Through interviews and from the 
surveys, it has become apparent that most of the Navy and Marine Corps contracting leadership 
are generally opposed to contracting out procurement functions.  Although they will 
acknowledge that some contracting functions, such as contract closeout, are being effectively 
performed by contractors and might not otherwise be accomplished in a timely fashion, the vast 
majority of tasks are, in their estimation, so closely intertwined with inherently governmental 
functions that they must be performed by Government civil servants.  Even in those cases in 
which a buying organization is utilizing contractors fairly extensively, there is a feeling that if 
sufficient qualified personnel were available they would rather accomplish all mission 
requirements with Government employees. 
A policy regarding the contracting out of procurement functions is needed.  Sixty 
percent of the senior leadership believed a policy is needed to set the general boundaries for 
contracting out and would be extremely helpful in clarifying top management’s position on all 
aspects of this issue.  Their main concern is that there is too much difference of opinion 
concerning the definition of inherently governmental functions and a more direct application to 
contracting functions is needed.  This is coupled with the perceived need for an identification of 
conflict of interest mitigation strategies, metrics to be used in evaluating contractor performance, 
appropriate sanctions for contractor transgressions, the qualifications and credentials that 
should be required of contractors, the hidden risks involved, and best practices in using 








Metrics should be developed and robustly utilized to monitor and assess 
contractor performance of Government contracting functions.  This research has found 
that the acquisition workforce believes that the procurement of contracting functions have been 
relatively effective based on only two primary factors: (1) was the mission accomplished in that 
the contracting functions were performed, and (2) did the contractor perform well enough to be 
considered for future contracts.  As was discussed earlier, there are obvious shortfalls in the 
existing means to determine effectiveness, in that it lacks clearly defined criteria and the degree 
to which the value of effectiveness is determined.  To aid in the development of valid metrics to 
determine effectiveness, it is recommended that organizations use the model depicted in 
Appendix 1.  This study suggests specifics that could be used as a starting point for creation of 
organization-unique metrics and measures for local application that can be inserted into the 
appropriate sections of the model.   Data requirements should be tailored within the model 
framework for each unique application and should strike a proper balance to ensure that they 
can elicit contractor performance consistent with strategic organizational performance goals.  
Activities should utilize this model framework as the basis of construct for any contracting action 
for procurement functions.  Higher level management and policy personnel can use this model 
to gather and disseminate informational and actionable metrics within their organizations.  The 
value of this model is that it brings together the quantitative (objective) and qualitative 
(subjective) dimension together with the three types of metric categories (process, workforce, 
and outputs) and overlays these on the six phases of the contracting process.  The contractor’s 
work effort must be evaluated and assessed.  Government contracting personnel will have the 
principal responsibility for performing these evaluations.  In actuality, assessing the performance 
of a contractor performing Government contracting functions is not unlike the assessment that 
must occur when Government managers and supervisors are evaluating their own civil servant 
workforce.  Many of these judgments are highly subjective in nature but nonetheless must be 
performed.  It is suggested that this model will assist in that difficult task. 
The Department of Defense should issue a policy regarding the contracting out of 
procurement functions.  There is overwhelming evidence, as brought out in surveys and 
interviews, that some type of policy should be disseminated from the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense that will guide the Services and Defense Agencies through the challenges created by 
utilizing contractors to perform Government contracting functions.  This is not to say that 
organizations have not already successfully carried out the responsibility of awarding and 
administering contracts under which contractors are effectively and productively executing these 
duties.  At a minimum, the policy should address the areas brought out earlier in this paper.  
Such a policy will go a long way in helping to clarify many of the issues currently plaguing DOD 
acquisition organizations.   
Safeguards to protect the integrity of the contracting process when using 
contractor support to accomplish contracting functions should be strengthened and 
rigorously enforced.  Utilization of contractor employees to perform Government contracting 
functions is relatively new and has posed a new set of complex challenges.  This research has 
confirmed the existence of serious challenges to the procurement process that have already 
been known on a fairly widespread basis.  Not the least of these is conflicts of interest, both 
organizational and personal.  Other challenges that may increase as more and more contractors 
become involved in performing contracting actions are ethical problems, personal services 
issues, legal issues, and general overall threats to the integrity of the contracting process.  
Several measures are already in place to protect the Government from improper and unethical 
behavior on the part of both civil servants and contractors.  In many cases, however, experience 
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has shown that these have not been enforced with the thoroughness and as meticulously as 
they should be imposed.    Contracting personnel interviewed and surveyed for this research 
have repeatedly pointed to the potential for biased and less-than-objective action on the part of 
contractor employees whose loyalties and motivations may, from time to time, be at odds with 
the best interests of the Government.  The public image and reputation of the procurement 
process is vital.  The “fishbowl” environment within which this process takes place sets an even 
greater responsibility for preserving an untarnished image on all members of the acquisition 
workforce. 
The prohibition on the use of personal services contracts should be removed.  
Throughout this study, references to the difficulties encountered by Government organizations 
attempting to avoid personal services situations have continually arisen.  Although a contract 
may have been carefully crafted to eliminate any potential for such a relationship, including a 
precisely defined statement of work, actual contract execution may be riddled with instances 
where the line has been crossed.  Some organizations have taken extreme measures, at some 
expense, to structure working relationships that meticulously avert any opportunity for personal 
services.  Other organizations have essentially ignored the rules because they are too 
unrealistic and unworkable.  It has been demonstrated in this study that the close working 
relationship so important to effective execution of contracting duties requires a significant 
amount of interaction and direction that is of a personal services nature.  This recommendation 
is consistent with a recommendation by the Acquisition Advisory Panel, which called for removal 
of the restriction regarding supervision of contractor employees by Government personnel.  All 
of the other aspects of the employer-employee relationship, such as hiring, firing, performance 
appraisal, compensation, promotion, etc., remain exclusively within the contractor’s area of 
responsibility. 
Civil and criminal penalties currently applicable to Federal employees should be 
extended to contractor employees who are performing contracting functions for the 
Government.  It has been noted in this study that contractor personnel performing procurement 
functions on behalf of the Government are not subject to the same penalties and consequences 
that would be enforced upon civil servants for violations of statutes, standards of conflict and 
ethical principles.  The Government is potentially at significant risk for unlawful or dishonest 
actions taken by contractor employees acting on its behalf.  Contractor employees are not liable 
for the work they perform or the recommendations they make.  Sanctions do exist for illegal or 
improper contractor behavior, such as suspension or debarment, but this generally fails to 
recognize employee misbehavior.  Companies that may have been injured by the unauthorized 
and prohibited actions of a contractor employee performing contracting actions may have 
recourse against the Government to obtain a remedy for an offense, but the Government, in 
turn, does not currently have recourse against that employee except to complain to the 
contractor and seek removal.  It has been expressed by many that contractor personnel 
performing Government contracting actions should be held to the same standards and 
consequences for wrongdoing as civil servants.  This could occur by extending appropriate civil 
and criminal penalties to those contractor individuals performing contracting functions. 
A hierarchy of contracting functions should be developed as a classification of 
tasks that can be used to support various decisions and reporting requirements.  
Appendix 2 presents a proposed “Hierarchy of Contracting Functions” as a conceptual method 
of arraying and evaluating contracting tasks or functions that are typically performed by 
Government buying organizations.  The hierarchy can be uniquely tailored to each organization 
to reflect their specific duties at the micro level.  The hierarchy can also be used by DOD and 
the Services/Defense Agencies as a macro-level approach to categorizing and distinguishing 
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tasks and duties by specific characteristics.  This taxonomical approach to classifying functions 
permits organizations to identify characteristics that differentiate functions from one another.  
Once an organization has defined the objectives of its classification, e.g., candidates for 
contracting out, individual tasks can be placed in the hierarchy according to the interpretation it 
has made about each task.  Explicit justification for the category of placement should be 
maintained. The hierarchy can then be used by an organization as an inventory of functions for 
a variety of purposes.  One such purpose would be to support submission of function 
designations under the FAIR Act.  The hierarchy could also be used by organizations as a 
common framework to compare the classification of tasks and supporting rationale with each 
other.  Additionally, capability gaps in skill levels identified by the DOD Competency Model 
could be overlaid on this hierarchical model to determine where a particular function under 
examination resides in the overall classification scheme. 
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